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Abstract 
This experimental study investigates insurance decisions in low-probability, high-loss risk 
situations. Results indicate that subjects consider the probability of loss (loss size) when they 
make buying decisions (paying decisions).  Most individuals are risk averse with no specific 
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1. Introduction 
The black swan (i.e. low probability and high loss; LPHL hereafter) events can be expressed as 
risky situations where probability of occurrence is low, but the harmful effect can be very 
dreadful (e.g., bankruptcy, insolvency, terrorism, and natural disasters). Both individuals and 
firms implement different risk reduction mechanisms, such as life insurance, credit insurance, 
home insurance, and storm shelters, against these events. However, how people decide to insure 
specifically towards LPHL hazards is questionable. Theoretical frameworks concerning 
protective measures chosen by individuals against LPHL risk situations have been developed 
over the past thirty years (e.g., Arrow, 1996; Cook and Graham, 1975; Dong et al., 1996; 
Kunreuther, 1979). Most have consistently demonstrated that insurance markets for high 
probability events can be expressed by standard expected utility theory (EUT); however, the 
EUT is inadequate to explain decision making processes in low probability risk situations 
(Hershey and Schoemaker, 1980).  As Morgenstern (1979) mentioned:  
[T]he domain of our axioms on utility theory is also restricted….For example, the 
probabilities used must be within certain plausible ranges and not go to 0.01 or 
even less to 0.001, then be compared to other equally tiny numbers such as 0.02, 
etc. (Morgenstern, 1979, p.178).  
Most survey studies indicate that some people perceive the risk as if no hazard exists, while 
others seem to react to the situation as if it is a frequent risk exposure condition (e.g. Camerer 
and Kunreuther, 1989; McClelland et al., 1990; McDaniels et al., 1992; Slovic et al., 1980). The 
reasons why individuals behave in two opposite ways have not attracted enough attention in the 
literature. One possible reason might be that some people may take into account the low 
probability of occurrence and react to LPHL risks as if there is no such risk, while others may 
focus on the high loss and thus overreact (Etchart-Vincent, 2004). In fact, Sjöberg (1999) finds 
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that the demand for risk reduction is influenced by the severity of the hazard and not by the 
probability. Yet, some other scholars conclude that people make insurance decisions based on 
probability estimates (Slovic et al., 1977)2. The lack of a definite answer to the question of 
whether individuals focus on low probability or high loss when they make insurance decisions in 
LPHL situations, stresses the necessity for further empirical research. 
The present study contributes to this research stream by conducting an experiment to 
examine a dominant risk assessing consideration, namely, the probability of loss versus loss 
amount on individuals’ insurance decisions in LPHL risky situations. During the course of this, 
we investigate whether using different elicitation methods induces any change in these decisions. 
In addition, we check the effects of individuals’ risk attitudes, their self-determined threshold 
probabilities and their demographic characteristics (such as age, income and gender) on these 
insurance valuations. 
In our experiment, we use two different probabilities of loss (p=0.01 and 0.005)3 and two 
loss amounts (all the income and half of the income) to test the dominance of probability and 
size of losses on the insurance decision. Furthermore, the design allows us to answer whether the 
two different elicitation mechanisms reported in the literature to detect the decision making 
process induce similar risk mitigation behaviour. Specifically, we try to examine the differences 
in individuals’ insurance decisions between the case when they are asked to decide whether they 
want to buy the insurance or not (asking dichotomous questions to elicit an individual’s choice), 
and the case when they are asked to state the amount of money they are willing to pay for the 
insurance (asking open-ended questions to elicit an individual’s valuation). The theoretical 
framework does not distinguish risk reduction mechanisms, such as insurance. However, 
                                                
2 An alternative explanation could be that subjects behave according prospect theory in this case they will 
overestimate the probability in both cases to about the same larger value. 
3 Note that “low” probability is mostly taken as 0.01 and less in the empirical literature (e.g., Camerer, 1995; 
McClelland et al., 1993, Ganderton et al., 2000). 
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according to the preference reversal phenomenon, individuals may consider different kinds of 
information when they make choice versus pricing/valuation decisions (Grether and Plott, 1979; 
Holt, 1986; Kagel and Roth, 1995, Segal, 1988; Tversky, Sattah, and Slovic, 1988; Tversky, 
Slovic, and Kahneman, 1990). More specifically, when people make choices they focus on the 
probability and when they assign values they look at the size of the outcome. Previous 
experimental studies about LPHL risks investigate either buying insurance decisions or paying 
for insurance decisions. To our knowledge there is no study that investigates both. According to 
the most recent experimental study that utilises buying decisions (through asking dichotomous 
questions) to examine insurance decisions in LPHL situations, the probability of occurrence of 
the risky event plays a dominant role in valuing insurance (Ganderton et al., 2000). However, 
another experimental study by McClelland et al. (1993) investigates insurance paying decisions 
(using open-ended questions), and concluded that some individuals are willing to pay zero while 
others are willing to pay much higher than the expected loss value. This contradiction 
necessitates further research.  
Moreover, our experimental design also allows us to elicit a threshold probability in 
individuals’ minds and gauge their risk attitudes towards the effects of these insurance decisions. 
A “threshold probability” is presented as the minimum probability in an individual’s mind for a 
given amount of loss for which he/she buys insurance. Through eliciting individuals’ threshold 
probabilities, we can also test the prospective reference theory, which suggests that people 
overestimate the risk if the probability is below a particular threshold probability and 
underestimate if it is above the threshold probability (Viscusi and Evans, 1990). We also 
determine subjects’ risk attitudes by following the calculation used by McClelland et al. (1993). 
This enables us to test the consistency of our results with the well known fourfold patterns of risk 
attitudes (Di Mauro and Maffioletti, 2004). According to the well known fourfold patterns of risk 
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attitudes as suggested by Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), people are risk averse 
for gains and risk seekers for losses in high probability events, and risk averse for losses and risk 
seekers for gains in low probability events. Finally, in addition to the effects of threshold 
probability and risk attitude, we examine how an individual’s endowment  in the experiment, 
gender, age and income influences his/her insurance buying and paying decisions.   
The results of the current study are important for academicians and practitioners in the 
insurance market in many aspects. It contributes to the literature by answering whether using 
different methods to elicit individuals’ insurance valuations changes their decisions and affects 
the dominant consideration of probability of loss and amount of loss. In other words, the study 
answers the question “do individuals consider different kinds of information when they make 
choice versus pricing insurance decisions?”. Further, it tests prospective reference theory through 
asking individuals’ threshold probabilities in low-probability and high-loss risk context. The 
practitioners in the insurance industry may use information about (1) the dominant consideration 
of probability of loss versus size of loss on consumers’ decisions, (2) the minimum probability of 
loss in their mind necessary to start considering insuring, (3) their risk attitudes and (4) the role 
of gender, income and age on decisions for motivating society to mitigate LPHL risks (such as 
natural disasters). 
 
2. Experimental Method 
96 subjects took part in the experiment. All of them first received a questionnaire asking their 
demographic characteristics such as their age, gender and income before receiving written 
instructions on the experiment.4 The experiment has two phases. The purpose of the first phase is 
to give subjects a “hard earned income”, which they then had to protect in the second phase of 
                                                
4 The original instructions were in German. Instructions in English are available upon request. 
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the experiment. This raises the salience of the incentive scheme, since we believe subjects 
perceive this income as their income and not as a manna from heaven.5 More specifically, in 
Phase 1, subjects are presented with a set of pairwise choice questions; each pairwise choice is 
composed of two lotteries, labelled “Lottery A” and “Lottery B”, of the kind depicted in Figure 
1. Each subject has to report his/her preference between the two lotteries. 
 
Lottery A     Lottery B 
 
Figure 1: Sample Presentation of Lotteries 
 
The same 10 pairwise choice lotteries (reported in Table 1) are given to all subjects to make 
their choice decisions. The time taken to complete each session varies across subjects, since subjects 
are explicitly encouraged to proceed at their own pace.6 The incentive mechanism is that, among 
the ten pairwise choice lotteries, one pairwise choice question is selected at random for each 
subject and his/her lottery choice for that pair is played for real by the computer. This is how 
                                                
5 There is well-established experimental literature (Thaler and Johnson, 1999; Plott and Zeiler, 2005; Guth and 
Ortman, 2006; Bosman and van Winden, 2002; Cherry et al., 2002; Bosman, et al., 2005) that shows people behave, 
ceteris paribus, differently if their own earnings are at stake (effort experiment) than they would if a budget was 
provided to them like a sort of manna from heaven (no-effort experiment). (Perhaps the term ‘non-earned budget’ or 
‘gift budget’ is sufficient. 
6 The required time to complete one session was between 15 and 25 minutes. 
300 ECU 
75% 
400 ECU 
25% 
300 ECU 
80% 
500 ECU 
20% 
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payments to each subject are determined in Phase 1. All the lotteries used in Phase 1 were 
composed of two of the four possible consequences 200 ECU, 300 ECU, 400 ECU, and 500 ECU.  
 
Question  
Number 
Lottery A Lottery B 
p1 p2 p3 p4 q1 q2 q3 q4 
1 .000 .000 1.000 .000 .000 .200 .000 .800 
2 .000 .750 .250 .000 .000 .800 .000 .200 
3 .000 .000 1.000 .000 .000 .700 .000 .300 
4 .500 .500 .000 .000 .000 .850 .000 .150 
5 .000 .000 .700 .300 .000 .150 .000 .850 
6 .200 .000 .800 .000 .500 .000 .000 .500 
7 .800 .200 .000 .000 .000 .800 .000 .200 
8 .400 .000 .600 .000 .000 .400 .000 .600 
9 .000 .000 .500 .500 .000 .100 .000 .900 
10 .000 .500 .500 .000 .000 .600 .000 .500 
Note: Lottery A takes the values x1, x2, x3 and x4 with respective probabilities p1, p2, p3 and p4 and Lottery B takes the 
values x1, x2, x3 and x4 with respective probabilities q1, q2, q3 and q4. The x vector takes the value (200, 300, 400, 500). 
 
Table 1: The 10 Pairwise Choice Questions 
In table 2 we report the individual payments. The money earned in Phase 1 determines the 
initial endowment for Phase 2. Note that we use Experimental Currency Units (ECU) and 
convert it to Euros at the end of the experiment. 
 
Endowment 200 300 400 500 
# subjects 9 25 11 51 
Table 2: Subjects’ endowment distribution 
 
In Phase 2, the subjects have to make insurance decisions to protect the money they earned 
during Phase 1. In this phase, they are randomly divided into two groups. The first group of 48 
subjects states their willingness to pay (their valuations) for insurance that reduces their losses in 
four different loss situations: two different probabilities of loss (p=0.01 and 0.005) and two loss 
amounts (all the endowment and half of the endowment). For example, WTP1 is the willingness 
to pay in a loss situation where subjects may lose all the money earned during Phase 1 with a 
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probability of 0.01; WTP2 is the willingness to pay in a loss situation where subjects may lose all 
the money earned during Phase 1 with a probability of 0.005; WTP3 is the willingness to pay in 
a loss situation where subjects may lose half of the money earned during Phase 1 with a 
probability of 0.01; WTP4 is the willingness to pay in a loss situation where subjects may lose 
half of the money earned during Phase 1 with a probability of 0.005.7 The Becker, DeGroot, and 
Marschak (1964) mechanism is used to elicit the willingness to pay (WTP hereafter) values: 
whether subjects buy the insurance or not depends on whether their stated WTP is greater or 
equal to the random price determined by the computer. This random price is between 0 and the 
amount of money earned during Phase 1. 
The other group of 48 subjects states whether they want to buy insurance or not (treatments 
BON1, BON2, BON3, and BON 4). The subjects make their choice for the same four different 
loss situations: two different probabilities of loss (p=0.01 and 0.005) and two loss amounts (all 
the endowment and half of the endowment). The prices of the insurances are given to subjects as 
equal to the expected losses.  
After both groups complete their buying and paying decisions,8 they are asked to state the 
minimum probability necessary to incite them to buy insurance in the four different loss 
situations, i.e. their threshold probabilities. The prices of the insurances are set equal to the 
expected losses. Whether the subject buys the insurance depends on whether he/she stated his/her 
minimum probability as smaller or equal to the random number selected by the computer (the 
random number being between 0 and 1). After all the decisions are made, one of the loss 
situations is randomly selected by the computer and played for real to determine subjects’ money 
                                                
7 The four situations were randomly ordered and presented to 24 of the subjects, and the reversed random order to 
the remaining 24 subjects.  
8 The reason for not asking some subjects threshold questions first and then the willingness to pay questions, is that 
the main aim of the paper is to somehow relate the bids with the threshold probabilities. By asking the threshold 
questions initially, subjects most probably would have stated very high threshold probability values.  
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balances at the end of the experiment. As noted previously, we use ECU and convert it to Euros 
at the end of the experiment. Three randomly selected subjects have their ECUs converted to 
Euros at the following exchange rate: 1ECU = €1, and for the others the rate is: 1 ECU = €0.02 
(for example, for one person 500 ECU= €500, for others 500ECU = € 10).9 
 
3. Results 
The experiment was run at the Max Planck Institute of Economics laboratory, in Jena, Germany. 
The computerized experiment software was developed in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Students 
from Jena University were recruited to participate in the experiment using the ORSEE software 
(Greiner, 2004). 45% of subjects were male and the average age was 23 (minimum 19 and 
maximum 39). The average monthly income earned was 348 Euro (minimum 0 and maximum 
1100 Euro). It is important to note that the data is available from the authors upon request.  
 
Table 3 represents the statistics for 48 individuals, stating their maximum willingness to 
pay for the insurance (paying decisions) in four loss situations:  
 
WTP1 is a treatment where subjects state their willingness to pay, to protect their 
endowment, when the probability of the loss is equal to 0.01, and the loss is equal to all the 
endowment; 
WTP2 is a treatment where subjects state their willingness to pay, to protect their 
endowment, when the probability of the loss is equal to 0.005, and the loss is equal to all 
the endowment; 
                                                
9 Many studies have used similar random incentive mechanisms (e.g., Starmer and Sugden, 1991; Hey and Lee, 
2005; Drehmann et al., 2007; Laury, 2006). 
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WTP3 is a treatment where subjects state their willingness to pay, to protect their 
endowment, when the probability of the loss is equal to 0.01, and the loss is equal to half of 
the endowment 
WTP4 is a treatment where subjects state their willingness to pay, to protect their 
endowment, when the probability of the loss is equal to 0.005, and the loss is equal to half 
of the endowment. 
 
 
Accordingly, individuals gave very close values for insurance against risk situations with 
the same amount of loss. Specifically, the average willingness to pay in scenarios WTP1 and 
WTP2 are very close. Similarly, in WTP3 and in WTP4, both averages are also very close. This 
may indicate the dominant influence of potential amount lost rather than the probability of loss 
on subjects’ insurance valuations. Furthermore, it is important to note that subjects state higher 
mean values for WTP2 than WTP3, even though both have the same expected values. However, 
before concluding, these results should be strengthened by further statistical analyses. 
We tested the statistical significance of the differences of means of WTP values through a 
nonparametric test (Table 4). Accordingly, the mean values of the WTP with different loss 
amounts are not drawn from the same parental distribution, with the probabilities of loss 
remaining the same. More specifically, the difference between the means of WTP1 and WTP3 is 
statistically significant (p-value = 0.005), as well as the difference between the means of WTP2 
and WTP4 (p-value = 0.015). However, comparison of the mean WTP values of different 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
WTP1 135.7 185 179.2 175 102.8 47 57 72 20 9
WTP2 131.3 184 193.8 192 87 76 51 70 24 22
WTP3 106.1 136 168.2 162 50 57 38 42 18 21
WTP4 102.7 165 152.7 164 43 52 40 50 19 20
Loss Situation
Table 3 Descriptive Statistics for Willingness-to-pay Values
ALL Endowment 500 Endowment 400 Endowment 300 Endowment 200
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probabilities of loss, with amount lost being the same, were not found to be significantly 
different (WTP1 and WTP2, WTP 3 and WTP 4).10 This result suggests that it is the amount of 
loss that influenced individuals’ insurance valuation (i.e. their paying decisions). 
 
 
 
When the difference is significant at the 95% (90%) level (2-tailed), then we can conclude that 
the values are not derived from the same parental distribution. Irrespective of the endowment, we 
can conclude that there are no differences in subjects’ behaviour when expected values are the 
same (i.e. WTP3 and WTP2), and when the loss amount is the same but the probability is 
different (i.e. WTP2- WTP1). On the other hand, when the loss amount changes from half of the 
endowment to all of the endowment, with a loss probability equal to 0.01 (i.e. WTP3-WTP1) we 
can conclude that there was no difference in subjects’ behaviour. Similar conclusions hold for 
WTP4 and WTP3 (the probability changes from 0.005 to 0.01, with the loss amount being equal 
to half of the endowment), WTP4 and WTP2 (amount lost changes from half of the endowment 
to all of the endowment, with a probability equal to 0.005) and WTP4 and WTP1 (amount lost 
changes from half of the endowment to all of the endowment and the probability changes from 
0.005 to 0.01). 
                                                
10  Note that reducing the probability of loss and increasing the size of the loss in such a way that preserves the 
mean is a “mean-preserving spread” (also known as second-degree stochastic dominance) in the standard 
terminology (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1970; Machina and Pratt, 1997; Müller, 1998; Borglin and Keiding, 2002). 
Our data fails to support this since the mean differences between WTP2 and WTP3 is significant (p-value = 0.864). 
Endowment WTP3-WTP2 WTP2-WTP1 WTP3-WTP1 WTP4-WTP3 WTP4-WTP2 WTP4-WTP1
ALL -0.171(0.864) -1.543(0.123) -2.833(0.005) -2.155(0.081) -2.437(0.015) -3.381(0.001)
500 -0.767(0.607) -0.393 (0.694) -1.429(0.049) -0.455(0.267) -1.563(0.049) -1.650(0.043)
400 -0.674(0.500) -0.590(0.536) -1.483(0.108) -0.552(0.581) -1.089(0.176) -1.826(0.068)
300 -1,168(0.243) -0.441(0.688) -3.045(0.002) -1.021(0.307) -3.014(0.003) -2.971(0.003)
200 -0.816(0.414) -0.6724(0.500) -1.365(0.115) -0.386(0.713) -1.604(0.109) -1.365(0.115)
Z-values (p-values)
Table 4: Sign Test between Each Pair of WTP Values (Valuation/Paying Decisions)
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Table 5 represents frequencies and percentages for 48 individuals that state their choice in 
four buying situations: 
BON1 is a treatment where subjects state their buying decision when the probability of the 
 occurrence of the loss event is 0.01, and the loss amount is the whole endowment; 
BON2 is a treatment where subjects state their buying decision when the probability of the
  occurrence of the loss event is 0.005, and the loss amount is the whole endowment;  
BON3 is a treatment where subjects state their buying decision when the probability of the 
 occurrence of the loss event is 0.01, and the loss amount is half of the endowment; 
BON4 is a treatment where subjects state their buying decision when the probability of the 
 loss event is 0.005, and the loss amount is half of the endowment. 
 
 
 
As for the analysis of the 48 subjects that were asked to decide whether they wanted to 
buy insurance or not (buying decision) in Phase 2 (Table 5), 79.2% said “yes” when we asked 
them if they wanted to buy the insurance when the probability of the occurrence of the loss event 
was 0.01 (BON1 and BON3 risk situations), no matter what the loss amount was (all of the 
endowment or half of the endowment). Furthermore, more subjects decided to buy the insurance 
when the probability of the occurrence of the loss event was higher rather than when the loss 
amount was higher. The percentage of subjects that said “yes” for BON3 was 79.2% and the 
Frequencies Percent Frequencies Percent Frequencies Percent Frequencies Percent Frequencies Percent
Buy 38 79.2 22 81.5 5 83.3 9 81 4 100
Not1Buy 10 20.8 5 18.5 1 16.7 2 19 0 0
Buy 34 70.8 23 85.2 3 50 7 63.6 4 100
Not1Buy 14 29.2 4 14.8 3 50 4 36.4 0 0
Buy 38 79.2 21 77.8 5 83.3 8 73 4 100
Not1Buy 10 20.8 6 22.2 1 16.7 3 27 0 0
Buy 30 62.5 23 85.2 3 50 7 63.6 4 100
Not1Buy 18 37.5 4 14.8 3 50 4 36.4 0 0
Table 5: Frequencies of Individual Buying (Choice) Decisions
BON1
BON2
BON3
BON4
ALL Endowment 400 Endowment 300 Endowment 200Risk Situation Decision Endowment 500
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percentage of subjects that said “yes” for BON2 was 70.8%, given that expected losses remained 
the same. Given the potential amounts lost remaining the same, a higher percentage of subjects 
wanted to buy insurance against BON1 (the risk situation with the probability of loss being 0.01, 
and the loss amount being all of the endowment) than BON2 (the risk situation with the 
probability of loss being 0.005, and the loss amount being all of the endowment) and similarly 
more subjects wanted to buy BON3 (the risk situation with the probability of loss being 0.01, and 
the loss amount being half of the endowment) than BON4 (the risk situation with the probability 
of loss being 0.005, and the loss amount being half of the endowment). In sum, the frequency of 
the buying decisions indicates that the probability of loss rather than the loss amount most 
influenced subjects’ buying decisions. This conclusion, however, needs support from further 
statistical analyses.  
In order to test this result further, we conducted a nonparametric McNemar test (Table 6) 
and found that subjects more frequently wanted to buy insurance in the loss situation when the 
probability of loss was 0.001 (BON1) and when the probability of loss was 0.05 (BON2) (with 
90% confidence, p-value = 0.10). Furthermore, for the risk situation with the amount of loss 
being half of the endowment, the insurance buying decisions were different between the cases 
with the probability of the occurrence of the loss being 0.01 (BON3) and with the probability of 
the loss being 0.005 (BON4) (with 95% confidence, p-value = 0.025). These results, in sum, 
suggest that subjects changed their insurance buying decisions according to the probability of 
occurrence of the LPHL event. 
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The individual risk attitudes were calculated by taking the ratios of the WTP values to their 
expected values (WTP/EV). A WTP/EV greater than 1 indicates risk aversion, equal to 1 
indicates risk neutrality and smaller than 1 indicates a risk seeking attitude (see McClelland et 
al., 1993 for further details on calculations). Accordingly, when each individual’s WTP/EV ratio 
was calculated, we found that all subjects were risk averse, thus they all have WTP/EV ratios 
greater than 1, which is consistent with well-known fourfold patterns of risk attitudes as 
suggested by Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992; 
Harbaugh, Krause, and Vesterlund, 2002). Intuitively, a risk averse individual would have been 
more likely to state a threshold probability that is not much higher than the probabilities used to 
calculate the expected values: 0.01 and 0.005. However, the mean values for the threshold 
probabilities were found to be 9%, 3.7%, 5.5%, and 4.5% to buy insurance in the four loss 
situations, BON1 to BON4, respectively, used in our experiment. These subjects stated way 
higher threshold probabilities and thus, unfortunately, were not adequate for reasonable 
interpretation.  
In addition to the analyses explained above, we examined the effects of endowment, 
gender, age, income, and threshold probability on individuals’ paying decisions and on their 
buying decisions. We decided to use the risk situation with a probability of loss equal to 0.01 and 
loss amount of all the endowment (WTP1) because it had been the most frequently used 
Endowment BON1-BON2 BON1-BON3 BON2-BON4 BON1-BON4 BON2-BON3 BON3-BON4
ALL 0.10 1.00 0.50 0.025 1.00 0.025
500 0.10 1.00 0.50 0.025 1.00 0.025
400 0.50 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.50 0.50
300 0.50 1.00 1.00 0.50 1.00 0.50
200
p"values
FOR ALL CASES SUBJECTS BOUGTH, SO WE CANNOT CONDUCT THE TEST
Table 6: McNemar Test between Each Pair of Buying (Choice Decision)
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probability and loss amount values in LPHL contexts (e.g., McClelland et al., 1993; Ganderton et 
al., 2000). As a result of the regression analysis (Table 7), it can be observed that the higher the 
subject’s endowment generated during phase 1, the more risk averse the individual (relative to 
others) was, and the higher the value he/she was willing to pay to buy the insurance (p-values = 
0.000). In addition, women were found to state higher values for their willingness to pay to buy 
insurance than men (p-value = 0.041).  
 
Table 711: Factors that affect WTP1 
Moreover, according to the binary logistic regression used to analyse factors (endowment, 
gender, age, and income) affecting individuals’ buying decisions (against loss situation with the 
probability of loss being 0.01 and loss amount being all of the endowment, BON1), gender 
(women are more inclined to buy the insurance than men are) are found to be the only 
statistically significant factor (p-value = 0.019) that influence the buying decision (Table 8). 
 
                                                
11 Adj.R-square=0.77, degrees of freedom=6, F-statistics=28.348 significance p-value=0.000; **Significant at the 
95% level. Risk attitude is the four WTP/expected values that are used as a multiple-indicant measure of subjects’ 
risk attitudes.  Internal consistency measure (Crobach’s alpha) across these four indicants is estimated at 0.88, 
suggesting that the risk attitude measured is highly reliable. Endowment is the amount of money that subjects earn 
during Phase 1 of the experiment. Data for age and income (the monthly income of the subjects) are obtained 
through a questionnaire asked before the experiment. Threshold is the threshold probability that is stated by the 
subjects during the experiment. 
Coefficient t-statistics p-values
Intercept -259.6
Endowment** 0.364 -2.557 0.000
Gender** 18.842 2.661 0.041
Age 3.524 0.882 0.105
Income 0.105 1.361 0.181
Threshold 0.587 1.150 0.257
Risk attitude** 2.131 8.500 0.000
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Table 812: Factors that affect BON1 
 
5. Discussions and Conclusion 
Individual insurance decisions in low-probability and high-loss risky events have not been fully 
explained in theory. In survey studies, some people are found to pay zero for insurance, while 
giving very high values that are above the expected losses. The contradiction of these individual 
level insurance valuations becomes even more apparent on studying the results of the two 
previous experimental works (McClelland et al., 1993; Ganderton et al., 2000) about insurance 
decisions in low-probability and high-loss situations. The current experimental study contributes 
to the literature in many ways. First, it explores this inconsistency through examining the 
dominance of the probability of loss and amount of loss on individuals’ decisions. Furthermore, 
it uses both a dichotomous question (buying decision) and an open-ended question (paying 
decision) to gauge subjects’ insurance valuations. To our knowledge, our experiment is the first 
attempt to determine insurance decisions in low-probability and high-loss risk situations, 
eliciting both valuation/paying decisions and choice/buying decisions. This not only allows 
comparison of our results with previous research, but also allows testing the preference reversal 
phenomenon.  Second, there is no empirical work to date that tries to elicit threshold 
probabilities in individuals’ minds. In our experiment, we asked subjects to write down the 
                                                
12 Wald= 14.109, degrees of freedom=1, p-value = 0.000; R-square=0.46, degrees of freedom=5, F-statistics=7.258, 
p-value=0.000; *Significant at the 95% level, in that being women have a positive impact on buying the insurance. 
Date for age and income (the monthly income of the subjects) is obtained through a questionnaire asked before the 
experiment. Endowment is the amount of money subjects earned during Phase 1 of the experiment. 
Coefficient p-value
Endowment 0.000 0.943
Gender* 2.304 0.019
Age 0.300 0.204
Income 0.003 0.163
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likelihood of the monetary loss that would make them consider buying insurance. The 
experimental design also allowed us to determine individuals’ risk attitudes, which further 
enabled us to see the effects of these threshold probabilities, risk attitudes, and some 
demographic characteristics of subjects (such as income, gender, and age) on their buying and 
paying insurance decisions.  
Our results showed that when individuals were asked to state their willingness-to-pay for 
insurance (paying decision), they perceived the risk to be higher in the case of a higher amount 
of loss rather than a higher probability of loss. However, when individuals were asked whether 
they would buy the insurance or not (buying decision), the outcome of the buy or not responses 
supported the probability of loss rather than the loss amount on the individual’s decision making. 
This finding supports Ganderton’s et al. (2000) conclusion. They also used buy or not questions 
(rather than willingness to pay questions) when they stated the relative importance of probability 
on individual insurance buying decisions.  
In summation, an important contribution of this study is revealing the distinction between 
the buying (choice) decision and the paying (valuation/pricing) decision embodied in the 
different descriptions of willingness to reduce low-probability and high-loss risk. This result 
seems supportive of the preference reversal phenomenon (individuals may consider different 
kinds of information when they make choice versus pricing decisions) of which the significance 
remains even in experiments with different structures (Pommerehne et al., 1982).  In fact, 
“regulatory agencies even distinguish between probabilistic (concerned with likelihood) and 
deterministic (concerned with magnitude) risk assessments” (Kuhn and Budescu, 1996). 
However, economic theory does not distinguish the risk reduction measures along these lines.  
When people decide whether to buy insurance or not against events, they focus on lower 
probability, thus, intention to buy without any concern about price of insurance is affected by the 
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probability of loss. This may be a possible reason why people do not prefer to insure themselves 
against low-probability, high-loss events (e.g., natural disasters and bankruptcy). However, when 
people pass the intention stage and decide to buy, they primarily take into account the high loss 
amount for pricing insurance. Hence, once insurance companies convince individuals to buy 
insurance by explaining the effectiveness or usefulness of insurance itself, rather than focusing 
on the risk (because people take into account low probability of loss rather than high loss amount 
and thus do not really worry about risk), they can persuade people to pay high amounts of money 
to buy insurance (because people focus on high loss amount when making paying decisions). In 
addition, all subjects were found to be risk averse, which is consistent with well-known fourfold 
patterns of risk attitudes as suggested by Prospect Theory: risk averse for gains and risk seeking 
for losses in high probability events, and risk averse for losses and risk seeking for gains in low 
probability events. The threshold probabilities, on average, are much higher than the 
probabilities used to calculate the expected values and seem to have no significant correlation 
with any variable, providing no support for the prospective reference theory. In fact, the results 
of the regression analysis indicate that threshold probability was an insignificant factor in 
insurance valuations for both paying and buying decisions.  The analysis also showed that 
individuals’ initial endowment had a positive impact on the value of their willingness to pay. 
Finally, it is important to note that being female had a positive impact on, both, individual 
insurance buying decisions and paying decisions. This finding offers guidelines for businesses in 
the insurance industry in motivating low-probability and high-loss risk mitigation. 
The current study suggests that the inconsistent findings in prior research may be due to 
differences in elicitation methods. For example, the studies that use dichotomous questions to 
ask individuals’ insurance purchase decisions mostly found the probability of loss most 
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influenced the decision (e.g., Ganderton et al., 2000), which does not support the findings of 
McClelland’s et al. (1993) study, which uses open-ended willingness to pay questions. For 
further studies, insurance can be assumed to reduce the possible monetary loss to a certain level 
rather than to zero. Various elicitation mechanisms (see Holt, 1986 for the drawbacks of paying 
only one round) and loss situations with different probabilities and loss amounts could be used to 
investigate the distinction between insurance payments and choice decisions to generalise the 
results. The dichotomous versus open-ended questions approach used to elicit individual 
protection valuation can be designed to enable the researcher to compare both risk attitude 
measurements. The current experiment takes the expected values as the prices of the insurances 
in order to gauge individuals’ self-determined threshold probabilities and different price levels 
may contribute further information. Finally, an extended theoretical investigation is necessary to 
support the findings of the current experiment’s results. 
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